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The impact on the EU's external borders has been even greater, as it has shown once and for all that, more than fragile or vulnerable, some border controls, such as the sea border ones, are not practicable, especially those on Europe's southern sea borders.
It is precisely this infeasibility of border control in marine areas that leads to the accentuation of certain trends on Europe's external borders, such as the externalization of migration controls. New regulatory and strategic planning developments confirm this trend, as well as the current concern for deploying an integrated external border management system.
With regard to the phenomenon known as the 'externalization' of migration controls, the literature considers it to refer to EU actions aimed at reducing, sorting and controlling migration flows with the consent of third states in relations that are, by definition, asymmetrical. This article has addressed the different situations that arise, highlighting the advisability of differentiating between externalizing migration policy, on the one hand, and extraterritorial action concerning migration control, on the other.
In search of greater conceptual accuracy, the term 'deterritoriality' has been used, as it is more neutral than the other terms mentioned insofar as it evokes the idea of positioning outside the territory certain border control and migration policy functions, to be carried out by other states or by the state itself. Since these are situations and actions linked to migration and border control, they should be conceptually situated outside the territory; the deterritoriality option hypothetically makes it possible to encompass both the externalization and the extraterritoriality of border control functions concerning migration.
To this end, this article has focused on the various notions and activities that might be discussed in relation to the 'externalization' and the 'extraterritoriality' of migration controls and border functions, terms that, in sum, refer to migration control and management activities outside the territory, carried out by public officials of the EU states or by third states.
On the one hand, externalization is considered to refer to the management and control of migration flows, the activities of adopting agreements, programmes, action plans and measures to encourage third states to monitor their own borders and migration flows in order to control, restrict or impede physical access to the territory of the EU states, accepting the placement in their territory, or the rejection, of refugees and migrants from other states. It does not involve the presence of or direct exercise of control activities by public officials of the EU Member States. In fact, outside European territory it is highly debatable that states are strictly performing border control functions, as it is an area that may more accurately fall within the more generic field of migration flow control linked to migration policy and European external action.
On the other hand, extraterritorialization is understood to entail the performance of border control functions by states themselves outside their own territory. This case should involve the presence of or exercise by Member State public officials of some (effective) border control activities or functions in areas without state jurisdiction or in the territory of third states, with their consent.
We are witnessing a change in the very concept of border in this post-globalization era, in which certain functions are offshored and systematically placed outside a state's territory and checkpoints. However, territorial and extraterritorial actions must be differentiated from those occurring as part of external actions in or with third states for the purposes of migration policy and the control of migration flows.
The reality is that a new border space south and east of the Mediterranean has been configured for migratory flows, which needs a new policy of external borders for these areas. Therefore, we must reflect on new frontier spaces, with new concepts and approaches to the border that provide other parameters of action towards migratory flows and external controls.
Today, the Union needs new instruments and concepts for these new realities, especially so as not 120 flujos migratorios en anuencia con Estados terceros, en relaciones por definición asimétricas. En nuestro trabajo hemos abordado las diferentes situaciones que se plantean, poniendo de relieve la conveniencia de diferenciar entre Externalizar las políticas migratorias, por una parte, de la actuación Extraterritorial de control migratorio, por otra parte. Buscando una mayor precisión conceptual, preferimos utilizar el termino Desterritorialidad, que es más neutro que los referidos, al evocar la idea de ubicar fuera del territorio determinadas funciones de control fronterizo y de políticas migratorias, a desarrollar por otros Estados o por el propio Estado. Al tratarse de situaciones y actuaciones vinculadas a las migraciones y a los controles fronterizos, debemos conceptualmente situarnos fuera del territorio; por lo que esta opción de Desterritorialidad, permite hipotéticamente abarcar las dos situaciones de Externalización y de Extraterritorialidad de las funciones de control fronterizo respecto a las migraciones. Para ello nos centramos en las diferentes nociones y actividades que podrían debatirse respecto a la 'Externalización', 'Extraterritorialidad' de controles migratorios y funciones fronterizas, expresiones que, en suma, hacen referencia a actividades de gestión y control migratorio fuera del territorio, llevados a cabo por agentes públicos de los Estados UE, o por terceros Estados.
Por una parte, consideramos constituyen Externalización de la gestión y control de flujos migratorios, las actividades de adopción de Acuerdos, Programa, Planes y medidas que pretenden que Estados terceros vigilen sus propias fronteras y flujos migratorios, para controlar, restringir o impedir el acceso físico al territorio de los Estados UE, asumiendo la localización en su territorio, o el rechazo, de refugiados e inmigrantes de otros Estados. Esto no implicaría presencia ni ejercicio directo de actividades de control por agentes públicos de los Estados Miembros de la UE. En realidad, fuera del territorio europeo es muy discutible que los Estados estén realizando estrictamente funciones de control fronterizo, ya que se trata de un ámbito que se encuentra tal vez en el más genérico terreno del control de flujos migratorios y vinculado a la política migratoria y a la acción exterior europea.
Por otra parte, entendemos que la actuación Extraterritorialidad supone llevar a cabo funciones de control fronterizo por los Estados fuera de su territorio. Aquí debe existir en nuestra opinión presencia o ejercicio por agentes públicos de los Estados miembros de ciertas actividades o funciones de control (efectivo) fronterizo, en espacios sin jurisdicción estatal, o en el territorio de Estados terceros, con su acuerdo.
Estamos ante un cambio en la concepción misma de la frontera en esta era pos-globalización, donde determinadas funciones se deslocalizan y se sitúan sistemáticamente fuera del territorio y los puestos fronterizos de los Estados. Sin embargo, las actuaciones territoriales y extraterritoriales deben diferenciarse de las que se producen en actividades de acción exterior en o con terceros Estados a fines de política de inmigración y control de flujos migratorios. La realidad es que se ha configurado para los flujos migratorios un nuevo espacio fronterizo al sur y este del mediterráneo, que necesita una nueva política de fronteras exteriores para este área. Por ello debemos reflexionar sobre nuevos espacios e imaginarios fronterizos, con nuevos conceptos y enfoques de la frontera que aporten otros parámetros de actuación hacia los flujos migratorios y los controles exteriores.
La Unión necesita hoy instrumentos y conceptos nuevos para estas nuevas realidades, y sobre todo para no perder de vista que, a la hora de afrontar crisis como las migratorias y de derechos de los extranjeros que se acercan o entran en nuestro territorio y jurisdicción, Europa es una construcción racional que supone un Proyecto de progreso civilizatorio, y que como tal debe incorporar permanentemente sus valores y el respeto de derechos humanos en todas sus políticas, medidas normativas y actuaciones con extranjeros y Estados terceros, en sus propias fronteras exteriores y más allá de las mismas. Esto es esencial para la identidad y objetivos de la integración, y para la proyección de la seguridad, solidaridad y valores de la UE conforme al Derecho internacional y europeo de los Derechos Humanos. D'une part, nous considérons que l'externalisation de la gestion et du contrôle des flux migratoires constitue une activité d'adoption d'accords, de programmes, de plans et de mesures visant à garantir que les États tiers surveillent leurs propres frontières et flux migratoires, afin de contrôler, restreindre ou empêcher l'accès physique sur le territoire des États membres de l'UE, en supposant que le réfugié et l'immigré en provenance d'autres États sont situés sur leur territoire. Cela n'impliquerait pas la présence ou l'exercice direct d'activités de contrôle par des agents publics des États membres de l'UE. En fait, hors du territoire européen, il est très discutable que les États exercent strictement des fonctions de contrôle des frontières, car il s'agit peut-être d'un domaine qui est peut-être le domaine le plus générique du contrôle des flux migratoires, plutôt lié à la politique migratoire et à l'action exterieure européenne. D'autre part, nous comprenons que l'action Extraterritorialité implique que les États situés à l'extérieur de leur territoire exercent des fonctions de contrôle des frontières. À notre avis, il doit exister une présence ou un exercice par des agents publics des États membres de certaines activités ou fonctions de contrôle des frontières dans les espaces en dehors de la juridiction de l'État ou sur le territoire d'États tiers, avec l'accord de ces derniers.
Nous sommes confrontés à un changement dans la conception même de la frontière en cette ère de post-globalisation, où certaines fonctions sont délocalisées et systématiquement situées en dehors du territoire et des postes frontières des États. Toutefois, les actions territoriales et extraterritoriales doivent être distinguées de celles qui se produisent lors d'activités d'action extérieure dans ou avec des États tiers à des fins de politique d'immigration et de contrôle des flux migratoires. La réalité est qu'un nouvel espace-frontière au sud et à l'est de la Méditerranée a été configuré pour les flux migratoires, ce qui nécessite une nouvelle politique de frontières extérieures pour cette zone. Par conséquent, nous devons réfléchir sur de nouveaux espaces frontières, avec de nouveaux concepts et approches de la frontière qui fournissent d'autres paramètres d'action en matière de flux migratoires et de contrôles externes.
Aujourd'hui, l'Union a besoin de nouveaux instruments et concepts pour ces nouvelles réalités, et, surtout, pour ne pas perdre de vue le fait que face aux crises telles que les migrations et les droits des étrangers qui s'approchent de notre territoire ou y entrent, l'Europe est une construction rationnelle qui implique un projet de progrès civilisationnel. En tant que tel, l'Europe doit intégrer de manière permanente ses valeurs et le respect des droits de l'homme dans toutes ses politiques, mesures réglementaires et actions auprès des étrangers et des États tiers, à ses frontières extérieures et au-delà. Cela est essentiel pour l'identité et les objectifs de l'intégration, ainsi que pour la projection de la sécurité, de la solidarité et des valeurs de l'UE conformément au droit international et européen des droits de l'homme. The so-called refugee crisis of 2015 has muddled many aspects of European integration. It is not just a matter of migration policy or the reception of asylum seekers, but of numerous aspects linked to the very essence and nature of the Union and of European integration. European values themselves are at stake when it comes to tackling the challenges posed by current and future migratory pressure towards Europe. 2 This article will assess the impact of the 2015 refugee crisis on the European system of internal and external borders and the new aspects of migration control at the external borders, which go beyond the areas under state sovereignty or jurisdiction.
MOTS-CLÉ:
To this end, it will analyse (II) the structure of the European 'federal' area of free movement of persons and its border system, in force since 1995. The analysis of the crisis, its effects and the EU's response will show that this specific crisis falls within a framework of migration flows and migratory pressure whose access routes to Europe are well known and are determined by the migration paths referred to here as the gates of Europe with the neighbouring states of Turkey, Morocco and Libya.
It will also examine the situation of the internal and external borders following the crisis and present and future migration challenges (III). Specifically, it will analyse the obstacles to free movement and the status of the external borders as migration control evolves. In this regard, it will assess the problems of migration by sea and the current concern to implement and develop an Integrated External Border Management System. Part IV will focus on the externalization of migration policy and controls. It will review the various situations and propose classifying the set of experiences, norms and practices carried out beyond state jurisdiction and the EU's external action as 'deterritorialization'. The author will share his view regarding the advisability of differentiating between externalizing migration policies to third states and extraterritorial action for border migration control. The conclusions (V) will recap the main takeaways. 
SCHENGEN, INTERNAL BORDERS AND EXTERNAL BORDERS
The function of borders as a place for the control of goods and persons plays a decisive role in the process of European integration as it determines both the movement of goods and the mobility of people. Historically, this function of controlling people has been fulfilled at the border itself or at points near the dividing line. However, the European integration process has wrought significant changes in this border control function, primarily due to the progress made on economic and political integration. The creation of a unified economic area in the continental territories of the EU Member States has given rise to the need for functional simplification of the rules governing the internal movement of goods and people of any nationality in this common economic area.
This economic vector of functional unification of the territories of the states participating in the integration was amongst the powerful factors leading to the Schengen Agreements of 1985 and 1990 and responsible for the entry into force, in 1995, of the Schengen Implementing Convention -subsequently integrated into EU law by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997establishing homogeneous systems for controlling movement into and out of the 'federal' internal territory. It is undeniably a new historical experience of territorial coexistence for European states and an authentic evolution of the classical international border concept and models, resulting in the introduction of a distinction between 'internal borders' and 'external borders' in European states. 3 In short, it consolidated the reality of what has come to be known as the border-free Europe : "Europe without borders" a term that actually refers to a territory with no controls at the land, sea and airport borders between Member States and thus elides the term control. Indeed, legally speaking, a more accurate term would be a Europe free of internal border controls. 125 the definition of the single market itself since 1986 as an "area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured"(today, Article 26 TFEU)
The TEU and TFEU currently in force include a provision that enshrines in primary law the functionalist need for regulation of the free movement of persons in the area or unified economic territory, clearly differentiating between internal and external borders.
Under the TFEU, the European internal border system has the clear and powerful aim of eliminating controls and, therefore, establishing free movement in a 'federalized' territory free of border control. Article 77 TFEU, in the Chapter on Policies on Border Checks, Asylum and Immigration of the Title on the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, provides:
This provision was drafted with the explicit aim of encompassing all internal border-control situations ('ensuring', 'absence of any', 'whatever their nationality'), establishing a clear mandate with no room for divergent interpretations regarding the obligatoriness for states of not implementing border controls for people.
This system is complemented by the external border system, with the necessary controls due to the elimination of all types of controls at the internal borders between states. Article 77 TFEU further provides:
1. The Union shall develop a policy with a view to: (b) carrying out checks on persons and efficient monitoring of the crossing of external borders.
Thus, the Treaty regulates external border crossings with less detail than internal border crossings: it is necessary to carry out checks on persons and, also, monitor external border crossing; moreover, this monitoring must be efficient. However, the term 'efficient' is difficult to pin down legally and, thus, calls for subsequent assessment, probably of a political nature.
However, parallel to the elimination of the internal border controls, the Treaty clearly establishes the need to maintain the checks at Europe's external borders. Hence, the permanent nature of the institutional and legal construction of Europe's external borders and of the ensuing need for integrated ma- 126 nagement (Article 77(1)(c)), which will inevitably lead to the gradual reinforcement and development of the European border model.
These primary law objectives and regulation endow the Union's external borders with very special characteristics and properties and make them an evolving and fundamental construct inherent to European integration.
One of the most impressive achievements of European integration is precisely the development of its own border model, whereby the function of border control has been adapted to the reality of integration and the Schengen Area through the peculiar reorganization of the public power functions of monitoring and controlling the borders between Member States. Thus, through its regulation under the Treaty of Amsterdam, in force since 1999, the European border model already transformed the traditional concept of border by eliminating internal border controls, with the correlative security measures, and undertaking innovations in international law, such as the generalization of 'hot' pursuit on land. 4 In this context, the analogy of the EU as a political entity with some attributes similar to those of a state ideally requires the international integration organization to have the elements of a state, namely: nationals (European citizens); a common immigration law (its own set of rules regulating access to, stays in and exit from EU territory); and a territory delimited by borders where its main powers are exercised. At the same time, the nascent political entity must have a border policy for common control and relations with neighbouring countries.
THE 2015 REFUGEE CRISIS AND MIGRATION TO EUROPE
During the years 2015 and 2016, millions of people came to Europe as part of a phenomenon mainly caused by the civil war in Syria. It came to be known as the refugee crisis, and it overwhelmed all of Europe's external border control systems.
In principle, the crisis was caused by the historical confluence of various factors, including the consequences of the Arab springs in countries such as Tunisia, the effects of the intervention and war in Libya, and the Syrian civil war.
However, in a context of a progressive increase in the arrival of migrants to Europe's borders, the crisis decisively exposed the reality of migration to 
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Europe as a structural component of its existence from here on out. In this order of ideas, the Commission considers that migratory pressure is, and will continue to be, the new normal for the EU 5 in the medium and long term. This refers to the highly likely continued existence of migratory pressure or the massive arrival of displaced persons, who, due to crises, conflicts and environmental problems, amongst other reasons, may reach European territories.
In addition to its enormous media impact, this particular crisis has had profound consequences for public opinion and European integration itself, with all kinds of repercussions in the European Union and its Member States. Of course, many aspects that now seem to be a consequence of the crisis were already present or in an embryonic state prior to it. With the crisis, they have emerged or been called into question and thus need to be discussed and addressed legally, politically and institutionally.
A brief overview of some of the issues that, in the author's view, are the main effects of the refugee crisis could be instructive. 6 First, there is a terminological problem related to the use of varied terms, which the media often treat as synonyms: immigrants, refugees, asylum seekers, people who have 'fled', displaced persons, etc. Indeed, the crisis has exposed the conceptual confusion surrounding migration, as witnessed by the interchangeable use of the terms 'refugee/migrant', which, in turn, are confused with the term 'asylum seekers'. The migratory reality has led to the loss of the specific reference of refugees as defined under the Geneva Convention. This traditional conceptual category, well regulated under international law and in the Member State's respective legal systems, is today dealt with diffusely, as a large variety of situations, ranging from economic or environmental refugees to subsidiary protection, asylum seekers or mass displacements of populations, have been cast as humanitarian conditions.
In this context, the European regulatory system for the asylum and refugee procedure, known as the Dublin system, has been strongly questioned, as it places the main responsibility on the applicants' state of entry into the EU, which invariably places a larger economic and procedural burden on external 5 External migratory pressure is the "new normal" both for the EU and for partner countries, COM(2016) 385 final, 7 June 2016, at 6. 6 See the author's aforementioned articles, "Unión Europea, crisis…" and "Los refugia-dos…", supra note 2. 128 border states (Italy, Greece and Spain). The Commission has proposed adapting the Dublin asylum claim-processing system with a corrective distribution key, amongst other measures. 7 At the same time, the system devised for the immediate reception and hosting during the refugee crisis, known as 'hotspots', does not seem to have been acceptably implemented. The hotspots, or immigrant identification centres in Greece and Italy, have been widely criticized for their tenuous respect for the human rights of the foreigners at the centres. Their management shows that the systems for reception and registration upon arrival deployed at the hotspots in both Greece and Italy have been clearly insufficient 8 and require better coordination of agencies and appropriate regulation. 9 Of course, more careful consideration of the concepts and classification of the situations of foreigners arriving in Europe is certainly needed, as the concepts are linked to and determine specific legal statuses, which, in turn, determine the different rights and obligations of people in European territories.
Additionally, one key aspect for the European experience of integration by means of the EU is the free movement of goods and persons in the 'federal' area of free movement that the Schengen Area establishes between 22 EU states and 4 non-EU states (Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and Liechtenstein). With the refugee crisis, the essential issues linked to the EU's internal market, with its free movement, Schengen Area and internal and external borders, have been subject to considerable debate and a troubling political questioning, with numerous requests to re-establish control at some internal borders. Indeed, as a result of the arrival in Central European countries of more than two million people in 2015 alone, the controls at the EU's internal borders in Germany, Denmark and Austria were reactivated (in accordance 129 with the planned procedures). Thus, the survival of one of the pillars of integration, namely, free movement in the Schengen Area, was threatened at peak moments of the crisis.
Therein lies an unresolved substantive issue, namely, the legal status of displaced persons within the Schengen Area seeking international protection. In this crisis, displaced persons have overwhelmingly applied for refugee status, in the hope of obtaining humanitarian protection from the host state, or 'subsidiary protection' status, one of EU law's contributions to international refugee law.
Additionally, as will be seen below, the dramatic crisis has shown that control of the external Mediterranean Sea borders is an outstanding problem, as all the measures put into place by the states and coordinated by Frontex so far have been counterproductive or ineffective and have sparked major internal controversy, especially in states with external sea borders (Spain, Italy and Greece).
It is likewise worth noting that the crisis has highlighted the method of EU advancement, as, historically, it is the periodic crises that rock Europe that have ultimately led it to take small steps forwards in the integration of Europeans. In this regard, the transformation of Frontex into the European Border and Coast Guard Agency 10 with an increase in staff and expanded mandate, including new powers to conduct search-and-rescue operations, may be illustrative. 11 However, the migration crisis has opened deep cracks in the political te- 130 rrain and the legitimacy of integration. There is evidence of serious consequences for the EU's political integration, due to the direct economic and demographic impacts of the massive influx of people in search of protection, which involve the presence (at least in the medium term) on European soil of hundreds of thousands of people requiring aid and services from public authorities.
Unfortunately, some EU states have shown a rampant lack of solidarity: following the 2015 decisions to take in 160,000 refugees, a referendum was called in Hungary to question the refugee redistribution decisions and some states have even rejected refugee quotas. This led to a severe internal crisis in the EU. However, in the author's opinion, the repercussions of these internal attitudes and policies for the essence, values and identity that the Union embodies and protects are of an even greater scale insofar as they call into question the legitimacy and narrative of the European integration project itself.
The lack of internal agreement and solidarity of the Member States is largely what has overshadowed the adoption of structural and temporary measures by the EU, preventing an effective institutional, legal and political response to the crisis. Of course, the EU had not anticipated a critical migration situation such as the one it experienced, and its institutional and decision-taking mechanisms are complicated and poorly suited to enable a rapid response equal to the task.
The 2016 deal with Turkey is perhaps a clear example of this lack of foresight and poor coordination of legal-institutional responses, notwithstanding some short-term successes in terms of halting the massive arrival of refugees and displaced persons mainly from Syria, 12 the main burden for which conti- 12 The overall deal with Turkey, which played a key role in the 2015-2016 migration crisis, was reached in October 2015. It provides for both moving forwards on chapters of the accession negotiations, opened in 2005, and a commitment by Turkey to visa liberalization and greater control of border crossings from Turkish territory into Greece, with generous European aid to this end. The agreement (Statement) with Turkey on the readmission of refugees and relations with bordering countries was formally adopted on 18 March 2016 (Agreement or Statement contained in Press Release 144/16 of the Council, available at <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/>; lisa, P. 'The EU-Turkey Agreement: a turning point in the EU's policy approach to the refugee crisis but with the devil lurking in the detail ', Real Instituto Elcano Expert Comment 15/2016 , 8 April 2016 .
The nature of the agreement was subject to considerable legal debate. See, for example, 131 nues to be assumed by Turkey. 13 However, the Commission's overall approach, via its European Agenda on Migration of May 2015, has given rise to extremely important operational, legal and economic measures 14 and has a very valuable strategic profile. In addition, other measures taken, such as the New Partnership Framework 15 are quite far-reaching and can construct a foreign policy of their own to address the major problems of any kind caused by migratory pressure towards Europe.
santos Vara, J. "La declaración Unión Europea-Turquía de 18 de marzo de 2016: ¿un tratado disfrazado?" in Retos para la acción exterior de la Unión Europea , 2017, p. 289; and uria GaVilan, "La declaración Unión Europea-Turquía: la externalización de la seguridad en detrimento de la protección de los derechos humanos", in E. J. Martínez Pérez, c. Martínez caPDeVila, M. aBaD castelos and R. casaDo raiGón (eds), Las amenazas a la seguridad internacional hoy, 2017, p. 89. This is because its legal status as a treaty or a simple political statement has significant consequences in terms of monitoring its implementation and its enforcement by EU and state powers. In its decision on the case from February 2017, the European Court of Justice indicated that it was not a treaty signed by any EU institution, but rather, where applicable, by the Member States (Orders of the General Court of 28 February 2017 in Cases NG and NM v European Council, in which the General Court of the EU declares that it lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine the actions brought by three asylum seekers against the EU-Turkey statement which seeks to resolve the migration crisis, ECLI:EU:T:2017:128, 129 and 130). 13 For more information on the current situation and additional mobilization of funds for, for example, schools and access to healthcare for Syrian child refugees, see the overview provided in the Communication EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey: the Commission proposes to mobilise additional funds for Syrian refugees, 14 March 2018, IP/18/1723, and the factsheet 'EU-Turkey Statement -Two years on', April 2018, available at <https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/ sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/20180314_euturkey-two-years-on_en.pdf>. 14 The European Agenda on Migration, in COM(2015) 240 final, 13 May 2015. For information on progress on the Agenda's implementation, see the Communications of the Commission of 10 February 2016, available at <https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-271_en.htm>, and of 28 September 2016, available at <https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3183_en.htm>. More recently, Progress report on the Implementation of the European Agenda on Migration, COM (2019) 
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Overall, the EU's actions to address and regulate migration, refugee and asylum issues have been impressive in recent years. 16 However, the set of measures and policies is strongly hindered by a Euro-centric vision based on security issues and the formula of development cooperation in exchange for control of borders and migration flows in the states of origin and transit. This vision does not place African, Middle Eastern and Central Asian countries' interests and approaches on an equal footing with Europe's medium-and longterm interests in these complex migration issues.
In this context, the European Agenda on Migration continues to be implemented. 17 The Commission believes that the situation is still fragile 18 and aims to strengthen the EU's Asylum Agency 19 by shifting the emphasis to the regulations for the return of migrants 20 and to strengthening the European Border and Coast Guard Agency. 21 However, possible avenues of legal access to Member States, such as access to international protection through the European Humanitarian Visa, have not yet been clearly defined. 22 The formulas proposed to date (new Blue Card, new resettlement scheme, strengthening of cooperation with third states with pilot projects) 23 ostensibly seem insufficient as a strategic response.
THE GATES OF EUROPE: TURKEY, MOROCCO AND LIBYA
There is already a certain well-established perspective regarding the routes of entry into Europe. 133 ment was effectively created in spring 1995, it was not until the creation of the Frontex Agency, in 2004, that there began to be a global EU approach, with data and verification of the points of entry, external border crossings and migration trends.
It was thus verified that the main routes of entry for irregular immigration are not, as was once feared, via the external borders of Eastern Europe, but rather the external Mediterranean borders of the southern European countries. Specifically, most of the arrivals take place in Italy, Greece and Spain, although these countries are not usually the final destinations of the people who irregularly or illegally cross their external borders.
Various aspects of this finding should be highlighted: -There is an obvious physical proximity factor, determined by geography, that facilitates irregular access. In the case of Spain, access occurs in two areas: the area of the Strait of Gibraltar and the cities of Ceuta and Melilla, and the Canary Islands area. In the case of Italy, it occurs through the Italian islands off the Tunisian coast, such as Lampedusa. In the case of Greece, it occurs through both the European land border with Turkey delimited by the River Evros (or Maritsa) and through the Aegean Sea route, to the islands under Greek sovereignty closest to the Turkish coast.
-All three European countries are accessed from neighbouring states in the southern Mediterranean that are countries of transit or origin of migration: from Morocco to Spain, from Tunisia and Libya to Italy, and from Turkey to Greece.
-These areas of transit are home to territorial claims or disputes between countries on the northern and southern shore of the Mediterranean: between Spain and Morocco over the Spanish cities, islands and rocks on the African coast 24 ; and between Turkey and Greece over the Aegean Islands under Greek sovereignty.
-These neighbouring and bordering states, in turn, are located in or border with regions, continents and countries that produce, and will continue 24 The link between migrations and territorial claims in Gonzalez Garcia, I., "Rechazo en las fronteras exteriores europeas con Marruecos: inmigración y derechos humanos en las vallas de Ceuta y Melilla, 2005-2017", Revista General de Derecho Europeo, Nº. 43, 2017; "The Spanish-Moroccan Cooperation on Immigration: The Summary Returns Cases of Isla de Tierra-Alhucemas (2012) and Ceuta and Melilla (2014) 134 to give rise to, migration flows from North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, West Asia and Central Asia.
-In all cases, the migration takes place across sea borders, although in the cases of Greece and Spain, it also takes place across external land borders. Nevertheless, since 2005, the largest number of migrants to reach or attempt to reach Europe has come by sea.
-There are EU agreements with these southern Mediterranean countries, and even bilateral agreements (Spain-Morocco, Italy-Libya), that have restricted access by means of short-term solutions that fail to address the structural issues underlying irregular migration to Europe. It is worth noting in this regard that the approach pursued to date has not been the formal one consisting of the conclusion of mixed Treaties, Agreements by the EU or bilateral Agreements by its Member States. For instance, it is argued that the EU-Turkey deal of 2016 should not be maintained as such, due to its significant shortcomings, including its very nature as a dubiously legal instrument questionably regulated by Public International Law. 25 Additionally, bilateral agreements between EU states and third states have become a necessary complementary instrument for issues of migration flows to the EU. Particular attention should be called to the 'agreement' between Italy and Libya, 26 also criticized for the legal format used, i.e., a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), and the direct and indirect negative consequences it has had regarding respect for the basic fundamental rights of migrants in Libyan territory 27 .
-The EU considers the Eastern, Central and Western Mediterranean to be routes or gates of access. Frontex data show that the closure of or increa-25 For the agreement with Turkey, see Peers, S. 'The final EU/Turkey refugee deal: a legal assessment', EU Law Analysis 18 March 2016; Den heijer and sPijkerBoer, 'Is the EU-Turkey refugee and migration deal a treaty?', EU Law Analysis, 7 April 2016; and toyGür and BenVenuti, 'One year on: an assessment of the EU-Turkey statement on refugees', Análisis del Real Instituto Elcano, ARI 21/2017, 21 March 2017. 26 PalM, "The Italy-Libya Memorandum of Understanding: The baseline of a policy approach aimed at closing all doors to Europe?", EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy, <https:// eumigrationlawblog.eu/the-italy-libya-memorandum-of-understanding-the-baseline-of-apolicy-approach-aimed-at-closing-all-doors-to-europe/>, 2 October 2017. The Italy-Libya MOU is available at <http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/ MEMORANDUM_translation_finalversion.doc.pdf>. 27 "Italy to renew anti-migration deal with Libya". The Guardian 31.10.2019. 135 sed border control along one route leads to the reactivation of one of the other two, such that the routes alternate across different periods, due to crises or diversions of the access routes to Mediterranean Europe.
All these considerations suggest that these arrival routes through what is graphically referred to as the Gates of Europe are quite likely to be permanent in the near to medium-and long-term future.
III. VULNERABILITY OF EUROPE'S EXTERNAL BORDERS?
External border control in the EU dates back more than 24 years, and identified problems, such as external airport borders, which no longer pose a structural problem, or land borders, have been addressed. Important measures have been taken, such as the introduction of biometric identifiers on visas. 28 The trend of strengthening access control at external borders has been confirmed in the wake of jihadist terrorism attacks. For instance, measures have been taken to reinforce checks at the borders of the Schengen Area, expanding them to include EU citizens in general 29 through the amendment of the Schengen Borders Code. 30 However, the inbound migration of recent years has posed a serious problem of vulnerability of the EU's external borders 31 , both on land and at airports. 28 
INTERNAL BORDERS AND RESILIENCE OF THE SCHENGEN AREA
The logic of the Schengen common area of free movement entails establishing common external border control so as to enable the free movement of any person of any nationality within the area referred to here as 'federal' for the purposes of free movement. This has an important consequence, namely, it makes it possible to determine which people are entering or leaving through the common external border; in contrast, once they have entered the federal common area, they cannot be tracked, as there are no mechanisms for doing so. As the Frontex Agency itself has noted, "There is no EU system capable of tracing people's movements within the EU following illegal border-crossing". 32 The fact is that the massive inflows to Greece, mainly with a view to reaching Germany and Sweden, led to overflowing movements known as 'secondary displacements'. These people were forced by geography to follow land routes mostly through the Balkans to reach the Schengen territory via Slovenia or Austria. These sudden arrivals of hundreds of thousands of people led to the establishment along internal borders of fences, barriers and strong access control against the backdrop of an initially receptive Germany. This, in turn, led some countries to reintroduce certain intra-European controls. Additionally, the brutal jihadist terrorist attacks in Paris (November 2015) and Nice (July 2016) prompted France to declare a state of emergency and to re-establish systematic control at its borders.
The problem with the reintroduction of internal border controls is that they could potentially become permanent and that these types of events could be prolonged, making them the norm, rather than the exception, as provided for by law. Additionally, Member State notifications of the temporary reintroduction of control in accordance with Article 25 of the Schengen Borders Code have increased sharply since 2015, with references in recent years to threats due to the existence of 'significant secondary movements'. 33 In the author's view, this very appreciable impact on the Schengen system of free movement has caused serious, albeit reparable, damage. Indeed, as 137 argued elsewhere, 34 several powerful legal and practical arguments confirm the reversibility of the measures taken by the Member States at some of their internal borders:
• Primary law: As seen above, Article 77(1)(a) TFEU has a legal force that leaves no room for doubt regarding the agreed attribution of powers and the practical objective to be achieved, i.e. non-control of any internal land, sea or airport border between Schengen Area states. • The short-term nature of the internal controls in the 'federal' Schengen Area implemented as a result of the refugee crisis. Control is restored in accordance with pre-established procedures, namely, notification of the temporary reintroduction of border control, in accordance with a specific regulation, Regulation 1053/2013, which is being applied. 35 This regulation provides for regular situation reviews and Council authorizations to prolong control at certain points or sectors due to the existence of a threat to the overall functioning of the Schengen Area. 36 • The highly partial geographical nature of the temporary reintroduction of control, which is not carried out along the entire land, air or port border of some states, but solely at certain border crossings on sections determined in advance to be problematic. Only in the case of France was notification given of the reintroduction of control on all borders, due to the state of emergency declared following the attacks in Paris and Nice, as well as for events such as the Tour de France. These reasons are complemented with planning, from the start, by the Commission for the gradual reinstatement of complete freedom of move-34 Del Valle GalVez, 'Los refugiados, las fronteras exteriores…', supra note 2, at 762-765. 35 138 ment. 37 Overall, whilst in the early years the refugee crisis did lead to a visible repeal of the non-control of persons at certain internal border points in the Schengen Area, the general system of free movement of persons tends to be progressively restored, although not with the speed initially envisaged for the return to normal movement without control in the Schengen Area.
In fact, a proposal for a Regulation amending the framework for the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders is currently making its way through the legislative process. 38 The Commission intends to allow an increase in the time limit for this type of control, although with greater safeguards and procedural and evaluation requirements, in accordance with its conviction that it must always be approached as an exceptional measure of last resort. 39 As noted, it is ultimately a question of imposing order on these state initiatives that could involve an attempt to renationalize responses to threats to the public order and internal security, placing special emphasis on the exceptional nature of any limitation that may arise in relation to the free movement of persons. 40 A separate question is the related issue, not adequately addressed by the EU or its Member States, of displaced persons seeking refuge and moving within the EU until they reach their destination, without identification and in 139 a situation of clear vulnerability. 41 This is also a consequence of the Member States' option of not creating macro-camps in EU territory for the reception, registration, identification and processing of refugees' asylum claims, as Frontex once proposed.
In any case, whilst the common European response to the migration challenge may have fallen short of a 'collective epic', 42 the case of the refugee crisis has shown that the Schengen Area is reasonably robust and resilient in unexpected serious situations. In the 24 years since it came into force in 1995, this historical experience has followed a course that has evidenced fragility, but also, at essence, a great capacity to withstand and overcome challenges in tricky or delicate situations. In the author's view, this has to do with many factors, the very strong soundness of the unified economic area being one of the most important.
Since the agreement between the EU states and Turkey of March 2016 stopped the inflow of refugees, the asylum claims of the millions of people who arrived in 2015-2016 have begun to be studied or they have been placed under the protection of the different states. Therefore, the problem today is not one of internal borders and the guarantee of free movement, but of massive access to and reception at the EU's external borders, where controlled management of the crossings and registration and hosting of this huge influx of arrivals proved impossible, a situation that could happen again in the short, medium or long term.
EXTERNAL BORDERS AND THE NON-VIABILITY OF SEA BORDER CONTROL
The Union's external borders have very special characteristics, as they were created by the Schengen Agreements according to a model that was later inherited and assumed by the EU from 1997 onwards. Sharing the same control systems for entry into and exit from the 'federal' internal territory of free movement is, as noted, an historical experience and evolution of the 41 naïr proposes the massive concession of ID cards entitling the bearer to travel freely, a transit passport based on the 'Nansen passport' model (Refugiados, Barcelona, 2016, Chapter 13) . 42 The term 'collective epic' (épica colectiva) was coined by janer torrens ('El restablecimiento temporal…', supra note 40, at 930) in his overview of the reintroduction of internal border control following the refugee crisis. 140 European states' borders. 43 Additionally, as a political entity in statu nascendi, the Union needs to maintain a well-defined territory in which entry and exit across external borders is well controlled. The cumulative experience since 1995 -including under the international-law Schengen system prior to its absorption into EU law -means that the EU already has more than 20 years of experience with external border control. 44 The model's evolution has allowed it to reasonably assume control at land, airport and even seaport borders.
However, there are significant obstacles to carrying out border control at the external sea borders. By their very nature, these borders are very difficult to manage, especially given the continuous mass arrivals of migrants over the years via the Mediterranean. No single state, nor even the EU without the co-involvement of its Member States, can tackle these problems of emigration in the Mediterranean Sea and of the sudden mass arrivals or avalanches of dozens or hundreds of thousands of people alone.
In fact, the system has not proven to work well when the control tasks are carried out in marine areas beyond state jurisdiction, i.e. beyond the 12 miles of territorial sea. Indeed, the definition of external border has gradually been adapted to the need to push some border control functions beyond the port, into the high seas or even the marine areas of third states from which immigrants depart, as in the case of Senegal and the cayuco boat crisis of 2006 in the Canary Islands (Frontex Joint Operation Hera).
Hence, the seemingly unsolvable issue of the Mediterranean Sea borders, as the control of external borders originally designed for the Schengen Area is poorly suited to this environment. Therefore, the European marine areas and borders pose certain specific challenges that make ensuring effective surveillance quite difficult: the marine environment itself, the existence of large areas of the high seas, and the existence of differentiated SAR rescue areas, all in a conflict-ridden context of third states from the southern coast of the Mediterranean with diverse but highly complex problems. Furthermore, with regard to the rescue of immigrants on the high seas, wide-open questions continue to surround the SAR regions in the Mediterranean and states' obli- 141 gations in these regions, especially concerning the disembarkation of rescued persons. 45 Nothing tried to date to halt or prevent sea immigration has offered good prospects of becoming a sustainable, reasonable and permanent solution to the problems, which include the fight against human trafficking. An original body of law has been adopted to address issues affected by gaps in international law, ranging from the regulation creating Frontex to that creating the Border and Coast Guard Agency, by way of the rapid border intervention teams (RABITs) regulation 46 or the regulation establishing rules for the surveillance of external sea borders in the context of joint operations. There have even been moments of flirtation with the idea of a military response, in some cases fortunately averted by the UN itself and, in others, undertaken within the context of NATO or EUNAVFOR MED/Operation Sophia. 47 The extraordinary fragility and insecurity of Europe's Mediterranean borders make maritime surveillance insufficient and give rise to myriad new problems. These problems include issues such as the extraterritorial processing of asylum claims, the human rights of migrants in different marine areas, or the disembarkation of migrants in third states. 48 The most widely reported 45 Another sensitive issue is the applicable regulation and obligation for merchant boats to proceed to the rescue and disembarkation of immigrants. See Freedom, Security & Justice: European Legal Studies, Nº. 2, 2018, p. 135 ; acosta sánchez, M. "Sobre el ámbito competencial de las operaciones de paz: El enfoque integral de la operación militar Sophia de la UE ante la crisis migratoria", Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, nº 12, 2019, p. 15. 48 See Marinai, S. "The interception and rescue at sea of asylum seekers in the light of the new EU legal framework". Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo, 55, 2016 , at 901. In 2015 142 cases of NGO or merchant vessels carrying migrants rescued in the territorial waters of Libya or on the high seas being denied access to port (as in the case of the Aquarius, in 2018, or the Open Arms case in 2019) 49 fall into this category.
In fact, the barrage of legal problems posed to international and European law by irregular migration and migration in the Mediterranean in terms of the different practical control and rescue actions carried out by states and the EU is simply overwhelming. 50 This is especially true with regard to issues of respect and protection of the human rights of migrants 51 found at sea with the intention of reaching Europe. In this context one finds the morally devastating fact that the maritime migration routes account for the brunt of the horrifying objective data on massive daily deaths of migrants trying to reach Europe by sea, migrants pushed mainly by human trafficking rings into terrifying situations of danger and death at sea. 52 In this context, the EU's aim of coordinating its sea border control in the Mediterranean and on the southern external sea borders is not viable. Migratory pressure will continue in the short, medium and long term along the channels of arrival by sea to Europe (Eastern, Central and Western Mediterranean) and may even be occasionally accentuated in critical periods due to the changing and unstable situation of the African and Middle Eastern neighbourhood. Experience shows that the EU has, in the past, been overwhelmed and thrown into crisis by the sudden arrival by sea of a few thousands of people (as in the case of the cayuco boats in the Canary Islands in 2006 53 or the frequent arrivals to the Italian islands off the coast of Tunisia in the Central Mediterranean). Consequently, the internal conflicts of third states could relatively easily call the EU's entire system of reception and free movement within its internal territory into question once again.
In the author's opinion, it is thus the EU's sea borders that will require it to undertake a new border policy. Indeed, the circumstances and problems discussed here confirm that new approaches to migration flows and external border control must be organized, subject to a more integrated management.
ACTIVATING THE INTEGRATED EXTERNAL BORDER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
The refugee crisis in Europe in recent years also seems to have led to the consolidation of the aspect of the border control policy known as the integrated border management system.
What the TFEU calls the 'integrated management system for external borders' (currently referred to as European Integrated Border Management) is provided for under the decisive Article 77 TFEU: '1. The Union shall develop a policy with a view to: (c) the gradual introduction of an integrated management system for external borders.'
The title of the relevant chapter of the TFEU (Policies on Border Checks, Asylum and Immigration) points to three main areas, but the subsequent provisions seem to describe a gradually descending level of EU border activity: very powerful with regard to internal borders, likewise significant with regard to external control, but less farsighted with regard to the regulation of 144 the external border management system.
In fact, no specific article is devoted to the integrated border management system, unlike asylum (Article 78) and immigration (Article 79), suggesting a lower level of intensity in terms of EU regulation and powers. Indeed, insofar as it is an objective of the common policy (Article 77(1) ), the treaty only provides for the subsequent adoption of legal acts. Specifically, Article 77(2) (d) provides:
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt measures concerning: (d) any measure necessary for the gradual establishment of an integrated management system for external borders;
Following the migration crisis, however, the time for its activation seems to have come. In this regard, attention should be called to the Plan to develop an Integrated External Border Management Strategy, adopted on March 2018, whose main elements are: greater cooperation and shared information, with the Border and Coast Guard playing a key role; enhanced harmonization of the common rules and standards applied under the Schengen Borders Code; and risk analysis, providing for contingency plans and rapid response capabilities. The stated need to integrate other policies, such as the Security Policy and the fight against cross-border crime, and to cooperate with third states, especially on returns, should likewise be highlighted. Finally, the need to improve the funding and technical and human resources of the Integrated Border Management System is also underscored. 54 The main element of this integrated management strategy is undoubtedly the Border and Coast Guard. However, these concepts should be used with greater accuracy, in order to determine the consequences and legal scope of the related terms. These terms are sometimes figurative (e.g. to create a 'buffer zone' or 'buffer states' around Europe) and are intended to reflect the reality of the systematic outsourcing of certain border and migration control functions beyond the borderline and the land, seaport and airport checkpoints and border crossings. The terms or definitions used by authors are sometimes stark. 62 However, there is some awareness of encompassing a variety of situations that should be differentiated. 63 In short, these are situations that place certain functions that states have traditionally performed at the border or at checkpoints, as well as certain measures and actions related to immigration and migration flows, outside their land, air and sea territory. Accordingly, for the purposes of the present article, this set of situations will be referred to as the deterritorialization of migration control, as the various scenarios and realities all take place outside EU territory.
Therefore, in keeping with this effort to achieve greater conceptual accuracy, a more useful term might be deterritoriality, which is more neutral than Barrero R. and zaraGoza cristiani, 'Externalización de las políticas de inmigración en España ¿giro de orientación política en la gestión de fronteras y flujos migratorios? ', 8 Panorama social, nº 8, 2008. 62 For example, Fanjul points to 'la lógica de "externalizacion" que ha seguido la política migratoria europea desde la crisis de los cayucos de 2005-2006: comprar o forzar la colaboración de semidemocracias en el trabajo sucio' [the logic of "externalization" that European migration policy has followed since the cayuco boat crisis of 2005-2006: paying or forcing semi-democracies to cooperate on the dirty work] [translated from the Spanish]; whilst Pinyol writes of 'colaborar con países vecinos para delegarles el control de sus fronteras, en un intento de reducir la presión migratoria (habitualmente sobreestimada) y no responsabilizarse de la protección de derechos de las personas migrantes' [cooperating with neighbouring countries to delegate control of their borders to them, in an attempt to reduce (routinely overestimated) migratory pressure and avoid the responsibility for protecting the rights of migrants], [translated from the Spanish], in Agenda Exterior sobre Inmigración y Refugio, 28 June 2018. 63 148 those mentioned above, as it evokes the positioning of certain border control and migration policy functions outside the territory, to be carried out by third states or by the state itself. The Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy defines 'territorial' as 'of or relating to a territory'. As these are situations or actions linked to migration and to border control, they should conceptually be situated outside the territory; therefore, the deterritoriality option hypothetically makes it possible to encompass the situations of both the externalization and extraterritoriality of border control functions. 64
EXTERNALIZATION OF THE MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF MIGRATION FLOWS VS EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF BORDER CONTROLS
The literature often notes that some EU and EU Member State border control functions are performed by third states using imprecise legal notions, such as the 'delegation', 'attribution' or 'remote control' of the 'containment of migratory flows' or directly referring to the outsourcing by the EU of part of its border control outside its territory. 65 Usually, the legal link between the Member States/EU and the performance of these border migration control practices by third states is not clear in these analyses.
However, it is very difficult to consider, from a legal perspective, that the European states or the EU itself exercise direct or indirect control over the third states' actions. It is a very hard conclusion to reach based solely on the political and legal agreements entered into to date (including the paradigmatic case of the 2016 EU-Turkey deal) or the secondary regulations adopted by the EU. Apart from the difficulty of proving it, from an international law perspective, this does not seem to be a case of international responsibility of the European states or the EU itself for a third state's migration management 153 lity at them in light of the involvement of public officials from the Member States, of civil servants and public officials of the EU, or of civil servants of other international organizations.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The refugee crisis has shaped a new perception of the migration reality in Europe. The ramifications of its impact on European integration are visible and enduring.
The EU's response has included a certain strategic perspective, albeit weighed down by an excess of eurocentrism and a security perception that does not take third countries' interests into balanced account. The major economic effort being made supports a far-reaching strategy, only now beginning to be outlined, to promote economic development in the countries of origin and transit of migrants. Additionally, issues such as the monitoring of respect for migrants' human rights have not yet been suitably globally defined in this strategy.
Although the behaviour and response capacity of the EU and its Member States can be assessed in different ways, the truth is that the migration debate has decisively swayed a block of countries that are openly reluctant to engage in intra-European solidarity and accept the new realities and burdens entailed by the refugees already present and yet to come to Europe. This position is very negative in the medium and long term, since, as noted, the crisis has also underscored the permanence of migration trends and flows and the consolidation of the routes or gates of entry to Europe.
This article has considered the vulnerability of the European borders designed and in operation in the Schengen Area. The internal borders were the most affected at the start of the migration crisis and are likely to be marked by current regulatory changes, which tend to allow exceptionality as a relatively common occurrence in the European 'federal' area of free movement. Nevertheless, the resilience of this system of the absence of internal border controls in the 'federal' area of free movement is undeniable.
The impact on the EU's external borders has been even greater, as, in the author's view, it has shown once and for all that, more than fragile or vulnerable, some border controls, such as the sea border ones, are not practicable, especially those on Europe's southern sea borders.
It is precisely this infeasibility of border control in marine areas that, in the author's view, leads to the accentuation of certain trends on Europe's external borders, such as the externalization of migration controls. New regulatory and strategic planning developments confirm this trend, as well as the current concern for deploying an integrated external border management system 79 .
With regard to the phenomenon known as the 'externalization' of migration controls, the literature considers it to refer to EU actions aimed at reducing, sorting and controlling migration flows with the consent of third states in relations that are, by definition, asymmetrical. 80 This article has addressed the different situations that arise, highlighting the advisability of differentiating between externalizing migration policy, on the one hand, and extraterritorial action concerning migration control, on the other.
In search of greater conceptual accuracy, the term deterritoriality has been used, as it is more neutral than the other terms mentioned insofar as it evokes the idea of positioning outside the territory certain border control and migration policy functions, to be carried out by other states or by the EU state itself. Since these are situations and actions linked to migration and border control, they should be conceptually situated outside the territory; the deterritoriality option hypothetically makes it possible to encompass both the externalization and the extraterritoriality of border control functions concerning migration.
On the one hand, externalization is considered to refer to the management and control of migration flows, the activities of adopting agreements, programmes, action plans and measures to encourage third states to monitor their own borders and migration flows in order to control, restrict or impede
